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Abstract: 
Recent findings suggest that exerting executive control influences responses to moral dilemmas. In our study, 
subjects judged how morally appropriate it would be for them to kill one person to save others. They made these 
judgments in 24 dilemmas that systematically varied physical directness of killing, personal risk to the subject, 
inevitability of the death, and intentionality of the action. All four of these variables demonstrated main effects. 
Executive control was indexed by scores on working-memory-capacity (WMC) tasks. People with higher WMC 
found certain types of killing more appropriate than did those with lower WMC and were more consistent in 
their judgments. We also report interactions between manipulated variables that implicate complex emotion-
cognition integration processes not captured by current dual-process views of moral judgment. 
 
Article: 
When Pilate saw that he could prevail nothing, but that rather a tumult was made, he took water, 
and washed his hands before the multitude, saying, I am innocent of the blood of this just 
person.... (Matthew 27:24, King James Version) 
 
The synoptic gospels are notoriously ambiguous in assigning earthly culpability for Jesus’ death. Rather than 
actively sentencing Jesus to crucifixion, Pilate passively allows it by letting the multitude decide whether to 
release Jesus or Barabbas. When the crowd chooses Barabbas, Pilate claims his hands are clean regarding Jesus’ 
fate. We suggest that the gospel authors captured something important about humankind’s moral sense, 
particularly regarding the morality of being the direct agent of killing. 
 
Philosophers have long considered such issues in developing prescriptive ethics, but scientists are only now 
studying moral judgments in order to understand the generative processes that influence them. A lively 
theoretical debate concerns the role of emotion versus that of normative-rule-based cognition in driving moral 
judgments (e.g., Blair, 1995; Haidt, 2001; Lakoff, 2002; Mikhail, 2007; Nichols, 2002; Pizarro & Bloom, 2003; 
Prinz, 2006). Much of the excitement surrounding this debate derives from the neuroimaging work of Greene 
and his colleagues (Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, 
& Cohen, 2001; see also Borg, Hynes, Van Horn, Grafton, & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2006). Using functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), Greene et al. investigated the neural substrates of judgments about hypo-
thetical personal versus impersonal dilemmas. In personal dilemmas, subjects contemplated (a) causing serious 
bodily harm or death to (b) another person or persons, (c) in a way that did not simply deflect preexisting harm 
onto another person; personal dilemmas thus involved ―up close and personal‖ harmful acts the subjects directly 
initiated. Impersonal dilemmas did not meet these three criteria. 
 
These authors illustrated personal dilemmas with the footbridge problem, in which a runaway trolley hurtles 
toward five unaware workmen; the only way to save them is to push a heavy man (standing nearby on a 
footbridge) onto the track, where he will die in stopping the trolley. In an impersonal version of this dilemma, 
the trolley problem, one may save the workmen by throwing a switch that simply diverts the trolley onto 
another track, killing one worker. Most people find the action in the impersonal dilemma to be morally more 
acceptable than the action in the personal dilemma, despite their identical consequences (e.g., Hauser, Cushman, 
Young, Jin, & Mikhail, 2007). Why? Emotion prevails in personal dilemmas. Greene et al. (2001, 2004) 
demonstrated that personal dilemmas engage brain regions involved in emotion (e.g., amygdala, posterior 
cingulate/ precuneus), whereas impersonal dilemmas activate areas involved in deliberative reasoning and 
working memory (e.g., middle frontal gyrus, bilateral parietal lobe). Moreover, when subjects judge resolutions 
to personal dilemmas to be morally appropriate, they respond slowly and engage networks associated with 
executive control (e.g., anterior dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate). Greene et al. thus proposed a 
dual-process model: Personal moral dilemmas evoke an automatic, ―hot‖ emotional response that biases against 
responding in a way that causes harm, but this response may be overridden by ―cold‖ cognitive control. 
 
In our study, we tested this dual-process theory by asking whether individual differences in control, indexed by 
scores on working-memory-capacity (WMC) tasks, would predict cold, consequentialist responses to personal 
dilemmas. Research with nonemotive tasks indicates that (a) WMC variation predicts executive ability to 
override prepotent responses (e.g., Kane, Bleckley, Conway, & Engle, 2001; Kane & Engle, 2003), (b) WMC 
variation predicts abstract-reasoning performance (e.g., Kane, Hambrick, & Conway, 2005; Oberauer, Schulze, 
Wilhelm, & SüB, 2005), and (c) experimentally increasing working memory load impairs reasoning about 
future consequences (e.g., Hinson, Jameson, & Whitney, 2003). Therefore, we hypothesized that by controlling 
emotion and engaging deliberative processing, people with greater WMC would more rationally evaluate 
consequences within personal moral dilemmas. This is a strong prediction because executive theories of WMC 
(e.g., Engle & Kane, 2004; Hasher, Lustig, & Zacks, 2007) are supported almost exclusively by studies of cold 
cognition (but see Braver, Gray, & Burgess, 2007), and individual differences influencing such moral 
judgments are rare (Hauser et al., 2007; O’Neill & Petrinovich, 1998). 
 
Our second goal was to test whether the personal-impersonal distinction would survive a retooling of the 
dilemmas presented to subjects.
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 To do this, we redesigned the materials used by Greene et al. (2001, 2004) to 
address several significant problems with them: (a) More personal than impersonal dilemmas involved death or 
injury, and more impersonal than personal dilemmas involved lying or stealing; (b) unlike personal dilemmas, 
many impersonal dilemmas presented abstract, probabilistic-reasoning problems; (c) several scenarios posed 
nondilemmas (e.g., should a child murder his grandmother for not buying him a gift?); (d) the descriptions of 
personal dilemmas were longer than the descriptions of impersonal dilemmas (Ms = 124 and 102 words, 
respectively); (e) whether or not subjects’ lives were endangered was varied unsystematically across the 
dilemmas; and (f) subjects saw multiple versions of some scenarios, so carryover effects were possible (a 
potential problem for other, similar studies as well: Hauser et al., 2007; Mikhail, 2007; Petrinovich, O’Neill, & 
Jorgensen, 1993; Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006). 
 
Some of these shortcomings reflect vagueness in how Greene et al. (2001, 2004) defined impersonal dilemmas. 
Personal dilemmas met three criteria (bodily harm that was caused to persons and did not simply deflect 
existing harm), and any dilemmas meeting none, one, or two of these criteria were considered impersonal. 
Consequently, very different dilemmas were contrasted, so the materials failed to systematically capture the 
vexing psychological distinction between the footbridge and trolley problems. For example, dilemmas involving 
whether to make charitable donations, steal or damage property, or enact environmental-hazard policies were 
included in the impersonal dilemmas along with those involving deflecting impending threats of death (e.g., a 
runaway trolley, poisonous fumes) from an innocent group toward an innocent individual. To better equate the 
severity of outcomes of personal and impersonal dilemmas, we redefined the personal-impersonal distinction to 
reflect more versus less direct killing (see also Royzman & Baron, 2002; Spranca, Minsk, & Baron, 1991). All 
critical dilemmas involved killing one individual to save more people, but the killing contemplated in personal 
dilemmas was more physically direct than the killing contemplated in impersonal dilemmas; that is, the killing 
involved in personal dilemmas was less mediated through mechanical-technological means or through other 
people’s actions. 
 
Our third goal was to test whether other philosophically relevant variables influence moral judgment (perhaps 
moderating any effects of the personal-impersonal variable). First, because everyday moral dilemmas often 
involve costs and benefits to the self, and trolley-dilemma judgments change with subjects’ relationships to the 
hypothetical victims (Petrinovich et al., 1993), we systematically varied self-risk. We predicted that killing to 
save oneself and other people would be more acceptable than killing to save only other people; we view this 
self-other distinction as evolutionarily ingrained and thus automatically and intuitively processed (cf. 
Petrinovich et al.). Second, we manipulated whether the intended object of harm would die regardless of 
subjects’ actions, and we predicted that subjects would find killing more acceptable if it merely hastened an in-
evitable death than if the death were avoidable; we view this inevitable-avoidable distinction as relatively subtle 
and thus more rationally and deliberatively processed than the self-other distinction. Third, as have other 
researchers (Borg et al., 2006; Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006; Hauser et al., 2007; Mikhail, 2007), we 
examined Thomas Aquinas’ (trans. 1988, pp. 226– 227) doctrine of double effect (DDE), according to which 
harm is more permissible if it is a foreseen but unintended consequence than if it is an intended means to an 
end. Normative sensitivity to the DDE may partially explain the effects of the personal-impersonal distinction: 
In footbridge/trolley-type dilemmas, one either intentionally uses the bystander’s body (e.g., by throwing him 
off the footbridge) or unintentionally sacrifices another workman (e.g., by throwing the switch). People may 
therefore blanch at resolutions to personal dilemmas because they have internalized the DDE. Thus, half of our 
impersonal dilemmas required killing as a means, and half required killing as an unintended but foreseeable 
outcome. 
 
METHOD 
Subjects 
Anticipating future neuroimaging research on this topic, we used strict inclusion criteria. Specifically, subjects 
had to report no history of psychiatric diagnoses and no current illness or (psychiatric or flu) medication for 
their data to be included in the analyses. Of 145 subjects who completed WMC screening and the moral-
judgment task in exchange for partial credit toward an undergraduate course requirement, 32 had their data 
excluded: 16 who had a previous history of head trauma or were currently taking psychiatric or flu medication, 
12 who ignored instructions, 3 whose WMC data were invalid, and 1 who was agitated. We report data from 
113 native-English-speaking subjects (68 females, 45 males). 
 
WMC Screening 
Subjects individually completed three automated complex-span measures: operation span (OSPAN), reading 
span (RSPAN), and symmetry span (SSPAN). In each case, memory items were interleaved with items from a 
processing task. The response deadline for each processing task was tailored to that particular task and subject, 
based on latencies (M + 2.5 SD) obtained during pretesting with 15 processing-only items (Unsworth, Heitz, 
Schrock, & Engle, 2005). The processing tasks were verifying equations involving two operations (OSPAN), 
verifying the meaningfulness of sentences (RSPAN), and judging matrix patterns for symmetry (SSPAN). Each 
processing stimulus was presented until the subject responded or the deadline was reached, and was followed 
200 ms later by a memory item (presented for 250 ms in OSPAN and RSPAN and for 650 ms in SSPAN); each 
memory item was followed by the next processing stimulus or a memory test. 
 
In the OSPAN and RSPAN tasks, subjects were required to remember lists of 3, 4, 5, 6, or 7 letters (taken from 
a pool of 12) in serial order; in the SSPAN task, subjects were required to remember the sequential locations of 
2, 3, 4, or 5 red squares presented within an empty 4 x 4 matrix. For OSPAN and RSPAN, each memory test 
presented the pool of 12 possible letters (in the same locations each time), and subjects used a computer mouse 
to click on the memory items in serial order. Each SSPAN test item presented an empty 4 x 4 matrix, and 
subjects clicked the previously occupied (red) squares in serial order. For each task, three trials at each list 
length were presented in random order. 
 
Span scores (total number of items recalled in the correct serial position; Conway et al., 2005) correlated with 
one another, rs = .70 (OSPAN-RSPAN), .54 (OSPAN-SSPAN), and .64 (RSPAN-SSPAN). We created a WMC 
score for each subject by averaging z scores for the three tasks; WMC scores were normally distributed (skew = 
-0.497, kurtosis = -0.452). 
 
 
Moral-Judgment Task 
Materials 
We created dilemmas based on the contextual and consequential equivalence exemplified by the footbridge 
(personal) and trolley (impersonal) scenarios of Greene et al. (2001, 2004), modifying their materials whenever 
possible into critical or filler dilemmas, but also inventing our own (for examples, see Table 1; a complete set of 
the materials is available on the Web at http://www.uncg. edu/—mjkane/memlab.html). The subject was the 
protagonist in all dilemmas, each of which consisted of an introductory paragraph and a four- or five-sentence 
resolution. All subjects saw the same 14 fillers, which were similar to the critical dilemmas except that 12 
involved no deaths, 1 called for killing many people to save one individual, and 1 involved killing for personal 
gain. The 14 fillers made the content of our stimulus list resemble that of Greene et al. (2001, 2004), while 
controlling for confounds (as discussed in the following paragraphs). 
 
Each of our 24 critical scenarios had two resolutions: personal and impersonal. Subjects saw only one version of 
each dilemma (counterbalanced across subjects). All critical dilemmas involved killing at least one person in 
order to save more, pitting the desire to maximize good consequences against that to avoid causing harm. 
Wherever possible, we used identical phrasing for personal and impersonal resolutions, equated them for the 
number of deaths, and matched the length of the versions to within two words. 
 
Subjects’ lives were at risk in 12 of the 24 critical dilemmas, so that killing saved oneself and others (self 
dilemmas); subjects were not in jeopardy in the other 12 (other dilemmas). Additionally, in 12 of the 24 critical 
dilemmas, the sacrificed life would be lost regardless of the subject’s actions (inevitable dilemmas); in the other 
12, the life would be lost only if the subject acted (avoidable dilemmas). Our materials reflected a 2 x 2 x 2 
nested design, with three personal and three impersonal resolutions each nested within each of the 6 self-
inevitable, 6 self-avoidable, 6 other-inevitable, and 6 other-avoidable dilemmas. Mean sentence and word 
counts were matched (e.g., Mwords = 100.9, 95.3, 93.3, and 101.2 for self-inevitable, self-avoidable, other-
inevitable, and other-avoidable dilemmas, respectively). We created two lists, such that each dilemma was 
presented with one resolution (personal or impersonal) in one list and with the complementary resolution in the 
other. To test the influence of the DDE on judgments, we constructed the impersonal resolutions so that 6 
required killing one person as a means to save more people (instrumental dilemmas) and 6 involved actions that 
led to the death of one person as a foreseen but unintended consequence (incidental dilemmas). All personal 
dilemmas were instrumental. 
 
Procedure 
We tested all subjects individually. Dilemmas were presented on a computer monitor, in black type against a 
gray background. The experimenter read aloud on-screen instructions encouraging subjects to disregard legality 
and consider only moral appropriateness. Subjects completed two practice dilemmas before beginning the 
experimental trials. We randomized the order in which dilemmas were presented for each subject. 
 
Each introductory paragraph appeared alone until subjects pressed a key to begin viewing the resolution 
sentences; with each key press, an additional sentence was revealed, until all were in view (all text remained 
visible until the final response was made). The final sentence asked whether the resolution was morally 
appropriate; subjects responded by pressing one of two keys, using one hand for each key. The screen went 
blank for 1 s between dilemmas. After the experiment, subjects completed a demographic-health questionnaire 
that provided the information we needed to apply the previously mentioned inclusion criteria. 
 
RESULTS 
All null-hypothesis significance tests were nondirectional, with an alpha level of .05. We report ηp
2
 as our 
measure of effect size; prep indicates the probability of replicating the direction of the effect given similar 
procedures and subjects (Killeen, 2005). 
 
 
 
Responses to the Dilemmas 
The mean proportions of affirmative responses (i.e., that killing was morally appropriate) showed the predicted 
pattern of results for the personal-impersonal, self-other, and inevitable-avoidable variables (see Fig. 1). A 
repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) confirmed that impersonal killing was judged to be more 
appropriate than personal killing, F(1,112) = 48.05, ηp
2
 = .30,prep > .99; killing to save oneself and others was 
judged to be more appropriate than killing to save only others, F(1, 112) = 16.88, ηp
2
 = .13, prep > .99; and 
killing someone whose death was inevitable was judged to be more appropriate than killing someone whose 
death was avoidable, F(1, 112) = 31.35, ηp
2
 = .22, prep > .99.
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 The only interaction among these variables that 
was highly replicable was their three-way interaction, F(1, 112) = 8.29, ηp
2
 = .07, prep = .98. 
 
We first explored this interaction with a 2 (personal, impersonal) x 2 (inevitable, avoidable) ANOVA on the self 
dilemmas. The interaction, F(1, 112) = 4.13, ηp
2
 = .04, prep = .96, demonstrated that the personal-impersonal 
distinction had a stronger effect for inevitable deaths than for avoidable deaths: When subjects’ own lives were 
at risk in the scenario, impersonal killing was judged to be more appropriate if victims’ deaths were inevitable 
than if those deaths were avoidable, t(112) = 5.04, ηp
2
 5 .185, prep > .99; personal killing did not elicit this 
effect, t(112) = 1.23, prep = .81. The parallel ANOVA on other (i.e., non-self) dilemmas yielded the opposite 
pattern, F(1, 112) = 5.24, ηp
2
 = .05,prep 5 .94. When subjects’ own lives were not at risk, impersonal killing was 
judged to be equally appropriate regardless of whether victims’ deaths were inevitable or avoidable, t(112) = 
1.61, prep = .87, but personal killing was judged to be more acceptable when the deaths were inevitable, t(112) 5 
4.72, Zp
2
 5 .17, prep > .99. Note also that judgments in the two personal-self conditions and in the personal-
other-inevitable condition did not differ (all ts < 1.23, all preps < .81), indicating that although either self-threat 
or inevitability of death, alone, attenuated aversion to personal killing, they had no combined effect. In contrast, 
when impersonal killing was required, the self-other and inevitable-avoidable variables interacted to yield 
particularly high ―appropriate‖ judgments in the self-inevitable condition; that is, the proportion of 
―appropriate‖ judgments was higher in the impersonal-self-inevitable condition than in the impersonal-self-
avoidable and the impersonal-other-inevitable conditions, ts(112) > 3.65, preps > .99, and the proportions in the 
latter two conditions were equivalent, t(112) = 0.419, prep = .62. 
 
 
 
To address the influence of the DDE, we tested impersonal dilemmas for effects of instrumental versus 
incidental killing. Impersonal killing was judged to be more appropriate when it involved the unintentional but 
foreseen death of another person than when it involved killing as an intentional means to an end (Ms = .635 and 
.585, respectively), t(112) = 2.33, ηp
2
 = .05, prep = .95. However, impersonal instrumental killing was judged to 
be more appropriate than was personal killing overall (Ms = .585 and .472, respectively), t(112) = 4.79, prep > 
.99; thus, the DDE cannot account for the effect of the personal-impersonal distinction on moral judgments. 
 
Role of WMC 
We assessed the role of WMC in moral judgment by reconducting our analyses with WMC as a covariate 
(treating WMC as a continuous variable; Conway et al., 2005; Oberauer, 2005). The only effect involving 
WMC was its interaction with the personal-impersonal and inevitable-avoidable variables, F(1, 111) = 3.43, ηp
2
 
= .03, prep = .90. Figure 2 presents the mean proportions of ―appropriate‖ judgments (collapsed over the self-
other variable) for subjects with low, medium, and high WMC (defined by tertiary split); the WMC groups’ 
judgments appeared to differ only for personally hastening inevitable deaths. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We pursued this interaction with an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) for personal dilemmas, which yielded a 
WMC x Inevitable-Avoidable interaction, F(1, 111) = 3.28, ηp
2
 = .03, prep = .90. When considering killing an 
individual who would die anyway, subjects with higher WMC scores found personal killing to be more 
appropriate than did subjects with lower WMC scores; subjects in the three WMC groups found personal killing 
equally inappropriate for avoidable deaths. The parallel ANCOVA on impersonal dilemmas found no effects of 
WMC, Fs < 1. Thus, when judging the appropriateness of personal killing, only subjects with higher WMC 
altered their responding in light of inevitability of the victim’s death. (An ANCOVA testing the DDE by 
analyzing the effects of the impersonal-instrumental and impersonal-incidental variables found no effects of 
WMC, Fs<1.) 
 
A final WMC analysis tested whether better cognitive control predicted greater consistency of judgment, 
especially for personal dilemmas, which presumably challenged cognitive control more strongly than did 
impersonal dilemmas. For each subject, we scored each ―appropriate‖ response as 1 and each ―inappropriate‖ 
response as 0, and then calculated the standard deviation across judgments. Because WMC interacted with only 
the personal-impersonal and inevitable-avoidable variables, we collapsed standard deviations over the self-other 
variable. Our ANCOVA results indicated that judgments of subjects with higher WMC scores were less 
variable than were those of subjects with lower WMC scores, F(1,111) = 4.29, ηp
2
 = .04,prep = .93, and that 
WMC affected variability differently in personal and impersonal dilemmas, F(1, 111) = 3.48, ηp
2
 = .03, prep = 
.90 (for other WMC effects, Fs < 1). Follow-up analyses verified that WMC affected consistency across 
personal dilemmas, F(1,111) = 7.55, ηp
2
 = .064, prep = .97, but not across impersonal dilemmas (F < 1; see Fig. 
3). 
 
 
 
Response Time 
Results from a 2 (personal, impersonal) x 2 (self, other) x 2 (inevitable, avoidable) repeated measures ANOVA
3
 
on mean response times (RTs) indicated that personal dilemmas were judged faster than impersonal dilemmas 
(Ms = 4,783 and 5,601 ms, respectively), F(1,110) = 18.62, ηp
2
 = .15, prep > .99, but the self-other and 
inevitable-avoidable variables had no main effects (Fs < 1). The interaction of the personal-impersonal and 
inevitable-avoidable variables was significant, F(1, 110) = 4.18, ηp
2
 =.04, prep = .92. For personal killing, 
inevitable deaths yielded slower judgments than did avoidable ones (Ms = 4,999 and 4,566 ms, respectively), 
t(110) = 2.29, ηp
2
 = .05, prep = .94; this result suggests that some deliberation was required to reconcile a bias 
against personal killing with that toward hastening inevitable death. For impersonal killing, inevitable and 
avoidable scenarios yielded equivalent RTs (Ms = 5,415 and 5,788 ms, respectively), t(110) = -1.22, prep = .81. 
RTs did not differ between impersonal-instrumental and impersonal-incidental killing (Ms = 5,844 and 6,221 
ms, respectively; 5 subjects were excluded because of empty cells), F(1, 107) = 1.44, prep = .80; thus, RTs did 
not show an influence of the DDE. 
 
 
We also examined whether our data replicated the Stroop-like finding (Greene et al., 2001) of slowed 
―appropriate‖ responses to personal dilemmas relative to impersonal dilemmas (and relative to ―inappropriate‖ 
responses to personal dilemmas). To do so, we treated response as a factor in a 2 (personal, impersonal) x 2 
(appropriate, inappropriate) ANOVA (10 subjects were excluded because of empty cells). RTs for ―appropriate‖ 
and ―inappropriate‖ responses were equivalent (F < 1), and response did not interact with the personal-
impersonal variable, F(1, 102) = 1.07, prep = .77 (see Table 2). Thus, we failed to replicate the central behavioral 
result of Greene et al. (2001). 
 
To examine whether RTs were affected by interactions between our new variables and response, we first 
conducted a 2 (self, other) x 2 (appropriate, inappropriate) ANOVA, which yielded only a significant 
interaction, F(1, 97) = 6.97, ηp
2
 = .07,prep > .99 (15 subjects were excluded because of empty cells). When 
subjects were at risk, ―appropriate‖ responses were significantly faster than ―inappropriate‖ responses, t(98) = -
2.20, prep = .94 (see Table 2). However, when only other people’s lives were at risk, subjects were slower to 
endorse killing than they were to denounce it, t(108) = 1.97,prep = .92. Thus, subjects responded most quickly to 
save themselves and others, as well as to abandon only others; in contrast, sacrificing themselves and saving 
only others required longer consideration. Regarding the inevitability factor, only the 2 (inevitable, avoidable) x 
2 (appropriate, inappropriate) interaction yielded a significant effect, F(1, 101) = 6.95, ηp
2
 = .064, prep > .99 (11 
subjects were excluded because of empty cells). In avoidable dilemmas, subjects were slower to endorse killing 
than they were to denounce it (see Table 2), t(106) = 1.73, prep = .89; this finding suggests some deliberation 
over whether to take a life that would otherwise be spared. There was a weak effect in the opposite direction for 
inevitable dilemmas (see Table 2), t(104) = 1.34, prep = .83. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, the dual-process model of Greene et al. (2004) predicts that subjects with higher WMC will be faster to 
endorse personal killing than will subjects with lower WMC, because subjects with higher WMC better control 
Stroop-like response conflicts (e.g., Kane & Engle, 2003). A 2 (personal, impersonal) x 2 (appropriate, 
inappropriate) ANCOVA with WMC as the covariate found no support for the predicted three-way interaction 
(or for a main effect of WMC; both Fs < 1; 6 subjects were excluded because of empty cells). Indeed, in direct 
contradiction to the dual-process model of Greene et al. (2004), greater WMC predicted slightly longer RTs for 
―appropriate‖ responses to personal dilemmas (r = .18, prep = .90; all other rs < .10, preps < .75). 
 
DISCUSSION 
Hypothetical moral judgments about killing one person to save others are affected by the personal or impersonal 
nature of inflicted harm, the benefit to the agent, the inevitability of victims’ deaths, and individual differences 
in WMC. Our subjects found personal, direct harm to be especially inappropriate when it saved only other 
people, rather than themselves and other people, and when the harmed parties would not otherwise be killed. In 
contrast, they found impersonal, indirect harm to be particularly appropriate when it would save themselves and 
when the harmed parties would be killed regardless. Moreover, individual differences in WMC scores, which 
reflect cognitive-control variation, predicted moral judgments when personal killing harmed those whose fate 
was already sealed, as well as the consistency with which people made moral judgments about personal harm. 
These findings reinforce the importance and domain generality of WMC beyond typical laboratory tasks, 
demonstrate individual differences in moral judgment based on executive-control capability (despite noteworthy 
failures to identify individual differences in these judgments; Hauser et al., 2007), and clarify the particular 
roles of executive control in moral judgment. Although we replicated the effect of the personal-impersonal 
distinction obtained by Greene et al. (2001, 2004) and narrowed the definition of this distinction to relative 
directness, our findings do not support the idea that executive control must override prepotent emotional 
processes if people are to endorse provocative resolutions to moral dilemmas. First, WMC did not interact with 
the personal-impersonal variable alone in predicting judgments, as one would expect if cognitive control simply 
restrains emotional reactions. Subjects with higher WMC scores were more likely to endorse personal killing 
only when harm was inevitable, and this increased endorsement would seem to result from deliberative 
reasoning, rather than simply from executive control over emotion. The association between higher WMC and 
longer RTs when responding ―appropriate‖ to personal killing supports this interpretation, as does the greater 
consistency in judgments of personal killing among subjects with higher WMC scores (consistency across 
similar cases is a hallmark of rationality or reasoning; e.g., von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947). Second, we 
did not replicate the Stroop-like finding (Greene et al., 2001) of slow affirmative responses to personal 
dilemmas. Instead, our subjects, with our improved stimulus materials, responded faster to personal dilemmas 
than to impersonal dilemmas, regardless of judgment. 
 
Our WMC results may reflect a selectively engaged, voluntary reasoning system that can utilize WMC in the 
course of its functioning. For this suggestion to be correct, WMC must not predict judgments as a function of 
self-threat, if in fact the self-other distinction is processed automatically. We created the self-other variable with 
exactly this hypothesis in mind, and although further research is required to definitively determine whether the 
self-other distinction is processed intuitively, our data provide preliminary support: For self dilemmas, 
―appropriate‖ responses were faster and more frequent than ―inappropriate‖ responses. The reverse pattern of 
responses and RTs was observed for other (i.e., non-self) dilemmas. The fact that the inevitable-avoidable 
variable did not exhibit this pattern and, unlike the self-other variable, did interact with WMC suggests that 
inevitability is processed with more effort and deliberation. Our findings are important because, if the self-other 
distinction is processed automatically, they suggest direct cooperation—outside of (or subsequent to) executive 
override functions—between some types of automatic-emotional processing and deliberative reasoning in 
generating moral judgments: The self-other and inevitable-avoidable variables had interactive effects only for 
impersonal dilemmas. A simple egoistic bias alone cannot explain why self-preservation and inevitability 
combined to increase ―appropriate‖ responses only when subjects considered impersonal harm. Thus, 
automatically and more deliberatively processed variables may influence the formation of moral judgments 
when they converge, not only when they conflict (cf. Greene et al., 2004). 
 
Notes: 
1
Many moral-judgment studies rely exclusively on subtle variations of the trolley problem (e.g., Hauser et al., 
2007; Petrinovich, O’Neill, & Jorgensen, 1993; Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006). 
 
2
One dilemma (―Modified Fumes‖) was miscoded and deleted prior to analyses. 
 
3
Data from 3 outliers were deleted. Response (―appropriate‖ vs. ―inappropriate‖) was not included in this 
omnibus ANOVA because most subjects had no observations in at least one cell.
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